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Abstract
While	there	is	a	prolific	debate	surrounding	the	issue	of	conscientious	objection	of	




want to maintain a specific reputation, or they have pragmatic reasons. Reputation 
here is not simply understood as being in good standing with a professional body. 
Rather, reputation is treated in the sense that a craftsman might wish to be known for 
providing	a	specific	type,	quality,	and	style	of	service.	Professionalism	is	understood	
as acting according to the philosophical and scientific principles that are the basis of 
healthcare (such as acting for the benefit of the patient’s health and following well-
evidenced treatment pathways).
Prologue
I wish to start by highlighting what this paper is not about, why it has been written, 
and what I think it contributes to the discussion of healthcare objections. This paper 
does not tackle the issue of what we as healthcare professionals (HCPs) are meant 
to do; it is not about how we can follow Christ’s footsteps by making patients whole 
and growing in virtue. Rather, this paper is a response to the need for us to protect 
ourselves from cooperation with evil, particularly in places where there are no rights 
to conscientious objection (CO) and where objections might be best phrased in a way 
that utilizes secular, liberal, and pluralist train of thought. Hopefully, this will allow 
some to more effectively justify their objections in a CO hostile environment.
As such, this paper will frame the issue of healthcare objections as professional 
objection (PO). The article will outline four categories that can be utilized to make 
a PO, and in this process, it will rely heavily on the craftsmanship analogy. These 
four categories should enable one to raise a PO to a wide variety of procedures, for 
which one would want to raise a CO. PO, nevertheless, is not promoted as a form 
of deception. Rather, reasons that fall into these four categories are what make us 
conclude that something is either bad medicine, and hence should not be done, or 
makes us refrain from specializing in these types of activities.
While the PO framework does not justify healthcare anarchy, it certainly lacks the 
tools to signify what good healthcare is. Perhaps it is a vain hope, but the realization 
of the consequences of a PO framework might prompt some who largely subscribe 
to a secular worldview to reflect upon the teleology of medicine and moral absolutes. 
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Yet, as Christianity itself is not monolithic, these points should still be acceptable, at 
least to an extent, by a Christian audience.i
Introduction
This article briefly discusses POs and how they might relate to a HCP’s right to express 
professional freedom. By professional objections, this article refers not to what is 
often discussed as CO but to a wide variety of other reasons that might motivate HCPs 
to object to participation in certain procedures, often ignored in the CO debate. It is 
the point of this article to demonstrate that objections can be raised, utilizing reasons 
that do not involve deontological religious commandments; these are:ii
1. Clinical judgments based on a philosophical understanding of healthcare
2. Clinical judgments based on the evidence of healthcare science
3. A right of HCPs to shape their professional practice and reputation
4. For pragmatic reasons relating to running their institutions
While these have been listed as distinct points, there is overlap and interdependence 
between these categories. The latter part of this paper will demonstrate the value of 
these specific points, as well as their interdependence.
Within the current CO debate, these reasons have not been featured prominently. 
While the British parliament is debating changes in the legislation governing CO,1 it is 
important to acknowledge that HCPs are not only moral agents but also professionals 
dedicated to caring for their patients. It is, hence, imperative that the CO debate is 
not limited to matters of freedom of religion, but the debate should include the four 
aforementioned points. This will not only acknowledge the reality of the work of 
HCPs but will also make the legislation more applicable to those who profess no 
religion.
Professional Judgement and the Essence of Healthcare 
Philosophical understanding of healthcare relates to the scope of practice one believes 
he/she should undertake as a HCP.iii This might relate to the pursuit of particular 
goods one believes healthcare is concerned with (e.g. the good of the patients 
holistically understood).2 These goods relate to what one believes healthcare is—a 
therapeutic art and science concerned with the restoration of health.3,4,5,6 Based on 
such an understating of healthcare, HCPs might refuse certain services that are 
generally thought to fall within their scope of practice, for they do not believe that 
these services are compatible with the goals of healthcare. Even those who object 
to CO do accept such an objection (i.e. based on an understanding of what a HCP’s 
job entails), and they even accept that there are certain goods people seek to pursue 
through healthcare.7 Force-feeding prisoners can be regarded as torture rather than 
healthcare, and it is not something that HCPs should be forced to do.8,9 While some 
might argue that this is an example of CO, a HCP might not object to law-enforcement 
agencies using torture to defend a nation’s interest but might simply not want to 
participate in the process, as they do not perceive it as falling within one’s scope of 
practice. Another such procedure that many HCPs could potentially engage based on 
their skillset—but might not regard it as part of their job—is the provision of purely 
Vol. 35:3 Fall 2019 Pruski	/	Professional	Objections
151
cosmetic procedures, which do not, strictly speaking, fall within the bounds of health 
care.10 However, the same procedure might fall within the bounds of healthcare when 
performed in a different context (e.g. that of a victim of trauma).
Professional Judgement and Evidence-Based Practice 
HCPs are competent practitioners of their disciplines. They should understand the 
efficacy of various treatments and procedures, the risks attached to them, and how 
they relate to their patients’ conditions. In the UK, patients do not have a right to 
demand a particular type of treatment, especially if it is medically futile.iv, 11,12 It is the 
prerogative of HCPs to exercise their clinical judgement, and refusals on these grounds 
of professional opinion are clearly distinct from those that are conscience-based.13 
Moreover, even those opposed to CO agree that objections based on considerations of 
beneficence and non-maleficence are valid reasons to refuse a particular treatment, 
so as to ensure that they are helping patients and not harming them.14 For HCPs, such 
a refusal might be primarily about the good of the patient, as well as avoiding future 
litigation, losing licence to practice, or professional registration. Refusals are also 
about professional pride and reputation, mainly for those who compete for patients or 
funding (i.e. related to some of the other aspects of PO mentioned in the introduction.) 
Examples of such a PO might be the refusal to amputate a healthy limb from a patient 
suffering from body integrity identity disorder who claims that amputating the limb 
will improve their wellbeing. It might be the refusal to perform gender reassignment 
surgery for someone suffering from gender dysphoria. The HCP might refuse these 
because they believe that the evidence does not indicate that the procedure will solve 
the underlying problem, but that it will only damage the patient’s body and well-
being, hence being bad healthcare.15,16 Similarly, an HCP might object to the provision 
of homeopathic remedies, even if privately they have nothing against them. HCPs 
should not be forced to provide treatment that they believe to be damaging towards 
the patient and which will not provide any real health benefits. Such decisions relating 
to professional standards of patient care are proper to HCPs17 and should not be the 
subject of external coercion.
Shaping One’s Reputation
The maintenance of a good reputation is not understood here as the right against 
slander or as being in good standing with a professional body, but in a wider context 
like that in which one could understand the reputation of craftsmen (e.g. a tailor or 
a goldsmith). Some might object to the comparison of a HCP with a craftsman or 
artist, yet such an understanding of healthcare has been present at least as far back 
as the writings of Plato and Aristotle.18,19,20,v Moreover, in recent times, medicine has 
also been presented as a craft or art from the perspective of how it is performed in its 
direct physical dimension and with reference to the type of judgements a practitioner 
of medicine needs to make.21,22,23 With its practical application of knowledge and 
skill, as well as interpersonal interaction aimed at understanding the needs of the 
patient, healthcare (while operating on a different substance) is not that different from 
other crafts. This is not to say that the matter with which HCPs deal, (i.e. human 
health) is equivalent in its gravity to the matter with which other craftsmen deal. 
That human health is more important is self-evident, and, as such, it is right that the 
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legal consequences for sloppily making a ring are different from sloppily performing 
surgery. Yet this does not mean that the craftsman analogy is wrong or demeaning 
to HCPs, it only highlights the gravity of the considerations that need to be made 
regarding healthcare.
Good reputation is understood here in the context in which a craftsman can have 
the reputation of producing high quality products, providing a reliable service, or 
having products executed in a certain artistic style. Importantly, such a reputation 
might not be forged to have a universal appeal; quite the opposite—a craftsman might 
be creating products that appeal only to a specific group, be it because the craftsman 
shares the group’s sense of aesthetics or noticed an unexploited niche. As such, it 
becomes clear that craftsmen might have various motivations that influence the 
reputations they acquire. HCPs, like craftsmen, should be able to freely shape their 
professional associations, practice, and reputation in a pluralistic and liberal society.
While there are many facets to the issue of professional reputation, they can be 
broadly divided into the issues concerning institutions (both private and public) and 
individual HCPs. In some of these settings, reputation is more important, as those 
working in small private practices (e.g. physiotherapists, general practitioners, and 
dentists) need to compete for clients much more intensively than anaesthetists at a big 
tertiary centre. Similarly, healthcare organizations often compete for patients (e.g. 
private clinics or even NHS Trusts), and hospital units might be paid for the number 
of patients or procedures they have performed. As such, even big nationalized 
institutions do not want to fall into disrepute, as this might negatively affect their 
funding and the likelihood of private donors (such charities) supporting them or lead 
to penalties imposed by regulatory bodies. Moreover, institutions might rely on their 
reputations to attract the best specialists in their field to further raise the profile of 
their departments. Medical organizations, small or big, private or public, might limit 
the type of service they provide to be able to specialize in certain procedures and 
develop a reputation as centres of excellence for it. As such, they may not carry the 
relevant equipment needed to perform a procedure outside of their expertise. Centres 
or practices might also refuse to perform a type of procedure they deem them too 
risky, though, technically, they might have the resources to perform it. Rather, they 
refer the patient to a different centre.
There are several reasons why reputation might be important for HCPs beyond 
those that are important for institutions. HCPs might perform auxiliary jobs aside 
from their main occupations, such as expedition or sports medics, into which they 
might be recruited based on their reputation. A HCP might refuse to work in a hospital 
with a bad reputation or participate in a procedure that will risk creating scandal, as it 
might leave a permanent mark on their CV and affect their future employability and 
career progression.
Professional reputation might influence whether one gets the patient or becomes 
unemployed. HCPs (and centres) can already specialize in various fields, and HCPs 
often further specialize to become experts in a specific procedure (e.g. orthopaedic 
surgeons specializing in operations on a specific limb). Being able to refuse certain 
procedures (e.g. to maintain a reputation among a specific clientele or to devote one’s 
time to master a particular procedure) is not much different from being allowed to 
work (or train) within a particular specialty. Similar to the development of healthcare 
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specialties, this might benefit patients. While a group of HCPs running a palliative 
care centre in a country where euthanasia is legal might themselves be in favour 
of euthanasia, they might have discovered that some patients prefer to be treated in 
centres where this procedure is not undertaken. These patients (and their relatives) 
might be more comfortable knowing that they will not be offered a procedure with 
which they fundamentally disagree, even in a moment of weakness, and might take 
comfort knowing that the HCPs taking care of them do not engage in an activity 
the patients themselves regard as unethical.24,vi Similarly, some women (e.g. those 
holding strong pro-life views) might be more comfortable knowing that abortions are 
not performed in the clinic in which they are about to give birth.vii If individuals are 
allowed to run groups that pursue specific goals (even if the purpose of the group is 
to restrict its membership to people of a legally protected characteristic, such as sex 
and ethnic group25), then HCPs should be allowed to set up clinics that cater to those 
who follow a particular worldview (even if the HCPs themselves do not follow that 
worldview). This includes the right of Christian HCPs to develop their reputations in a 
manner that will attract Christian patients or gain influence in Christian professional 
bodies.
Pragmatism
Additionally, medical institutions might refrain from performing certain procedures 
on pragmatic grounds. These might relate to the complex socioeconomic situation, 
liability, and other practical issues originating from the specific work environment in 
which certain HCPs and institutions operate.26,27,28,29 Hence, even if the institution or 
the HCPs are allowed to provide the service in question, it might be more pragmatic 
for them not to provide it. Compelling HCPs or institutions to provide such a service 
(even if they are not morally opposed to it) might have a negative impact on their work 
(such as costs, stress, or dissatisfaction), manifesting itself in, for example, moral 
distress.30,31,32 Therefore, while some pharmacists in regions where they can prescribe 
contraceptives might not morally object to such prescriptions, they might still refrain 
from providing these services.33,34,35 While some services are clearly linked with each 
other (such as the provision of postoperative care to the provision of surgery) others, 
such as the provision of good antenatal care, does not depend on the provision of 
abortion services, and, for pragmatic reasons, a centre that wishes to provide the best 
possible antenatal care might not have the resources to provide abortion services.
Building on the Craftsman Analogy
While HCPs are subject to more scrutiny than goldsmiths or tailors, due to the nature 
of the subjects of their trade, the craftsman analogy provides a convenient framework 
for discussing the reasonableness of PO. Goldsmiths might refuse to use materials 
unless they have been ethically sourced, yet they might have no moral interest in 
the provision of such materials. They provide them to attract customers that do 
care about the source of the materials or to get some form of certification or guild 
membership that would professionally benefit them. A tailor might refuse to make 
a jacket according to the customer’s design, for the design is such that the jacket is 
likely to fall apart soon. This, in turn, might lead to someone claiming that the tailor 
produces poor quality clothing or try to get a refund for the product. The tailor might 
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refuse this commission simply out of professional pride or to avoid deterring future 
customers or to not have to commit time to then pay the customer a refund (or for 
all of these reasons simultaneously). Bakers might wish to avoid certain associations 
between their product and a particular event, even though, under other conditions, 
they might be willing to provide the product to the same customer.36,37 Their decisions 
might be based on CO reasons but could also be understood as the exercise of a 
“right to freedom of dissociation.”38 Such a freedom of dissociation could be invoked 
in some situations to, for example, avoid discouraging a specific group from using 
one’s services, for campaigners from a wide spectrum of ideological and political 
backgrounds have tried to persuade businesses, through various campaigns and 
petitions (including boycotts), to cease or commence different practises.
Craftsmen express their professional freedoms and take care of their businesses 
by both providing what their customers want or by not engaging in commerce with 
them, and they are motivated to do this by a wide variety of reasons. But each of 
these reasons to act in a particular way does not always operate in isolation. The 
craftsman who uses ethically sourced gold might do it for both ethical reasons and 
the professional advantages associated with it. Tailors who refuse to make a jacket to 
the client’s specification might not do it as much out of concern for their reputations, 
for they would simply hate for their customers to experience disappointment. The 
baker might have as much acted out of religious convictions as from reasons related to 
reputation. Who, in a liberal society, is to decide that one reason is better than another 
(though some limits relating to such actions will be discussed further down) or that 
CO is more convincing than PO? Certainly some of the aforementioned PO decisions 
are easier to comprehend from a secular standpoint than some CO decisions, at least 
partly due to a lack of a shared moral vocabulary between those invoking CO for 
religious reasons and their audiences in the secular space.39
To build on the types of PO mentioned throughout this paper and to relate it to the 
parallel of craftsmanship, it is worthwhile to analyse in more detail an example of an 
HCP objecting to a specific procedure—abortion.xiii For pragmatic reasons or reasons 
relating to reputation, a medical centre might not wish to provide abortions; the centre 
might only have facilities to provide antenatal services or might not deal explicitly 
with issues relating to maternity, and in order to expand the provision to such services, 
they would have to jump several administrative hoops and dedicate funds that they 
wish to spend on more pressing needs. Ophthalmologists might refuse to perform an 
abortion—a procedure outside their specialty—not necessarily because of lack of 
competence in the procedure (they might have previously worked as obstetricians) but 
because they chose not to pursue a career in obstetrics. Further, even those without 
a religious belief might regard every human as a person, and, hence, view foetuses 
as deserving healthcare.ix HCPs caring for pregnant women and subscribing to the 
aforementioned definition of personhood might wish to not perform treatments that 
are harmful to the foetus. For them, a pregnancy presents two patients whose goods 
should be sought. This is a professional statement, supported by science and a long 
standing philosophical tradition, and while arguments to the contrary exist, it is 
certainly a reasonable opinion to hold. Finally, HCPs’ CO against abortion due to a 
religious commitment does not exclude a simultaneous PO to abortion for any of the 
aforementioned reasons. It is more than likely that their religious CO is accompanied 
by a philosophical understanding of medicine that is incompatible with abortion. In 
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such situations, it seems unreasonable to understand their objection only from the 
perspective of CO.
Discussion
Those who work in healthcare, like in any craft, should be free to take pride in their 
work and shape their practices in a way that accords with their professional judgements 
and preferences, so as to gain a reputation that ensures patients will willingly use 
their services and so that they can find professional fulfilment. Objections based 
on professional opinion and ones that support specialization (for the benefit of 
patients requiring a specific service provision or to develop a sustainable business 
model for those working in private practice) should be understandable by legislators, 
other HCPs, and the general public. This might be easier to realize in independent 
practices than in big, private hospitals, where private contracts between the HCP and 
the institution might wish to restrict the HCP’s freedom. While in such instances the 
freedoms of the HCP are balanced against those of their employers, it would be odd 
for the government to compel all HCPs to take up one philosophical view of medicine 
versus another, saying, for example, that vasectomies are a healthcare service and, as 
such, a trained HCP should provide them. Such compulsion would deprive HCPs of 
professional integrity.40 A vasectomy is not a health restorative treatment, and HCPs 
might prefer to aid sick patients and participate in medical research or relief work, and 
are uninterested in providing services that they believe to damage patients’ normal 
bodily functions.
This paper has shown that there are several reasons why an HCP might want to 
object to certain procedures on professional grounds and that these reasons should 
be respected in a secular and liberal society where people can freely associate and 
dissociate.41 As respectable professionals, HCPs should not be compelled to forced 
labour, but should be allowed to specialize and use their professional judgements 
to build their reputations, as long as they do it without malice.42 As such, we should 
not limit acceptable objections to just the issues of abortion, euthanasia, and assisted 
reproductive technologies. A wide range of possible objections would ensure respect 
for HCPs’ professionalism and not treat them as mere automatons dispensing clinical 
procedures.
What this paper has not argued is that ethical and religious reasons do not play a 
role in a HCPs decision-making process. Indeed, there are good ethical reasons why 
a craftsman might wish not satisfy their customer; a military equipment provider 
might refuse to provide a customer with a suicide vest on ethical grounds, and a HCP 
might refuse participation in abortions and euthanasia on religious grounds. Ethical 
and religious considerations are of utmost importance, but the practice of objection 
cannot be limited to these considerations. CO and PO are both valid grounds for 
raising objections.
Addressing Potential Objections
One could raise an objection to the argument presented above and state that an HCP 
might wish to gain a reputation amongst members of the anti-vaccination movement 
by not providing vaccinations to patients requesting them and discouraging them 
from seeking them elsewhere. While the reasoning above would concede that the 
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HCP could not be obliged to provide a vaccinations service (e.g. a GP might only wish 
to provide a house call service and not keep a stock of vaccines),x it would not concede 
to the HCP advising any patients against vaccinations (presuming no established 
medical contraindications, such as an allergy to one of the components of a vaccine).
It is one thing to facilitate people’s preferences, and it is another to deceive them. 
While many procedures to which PO can be raised are either non-controversial (such 
as the example involving the use of Botox for aesthetic purposes) or are generally 
regarded as matters of debate in a liberal society (such as the personhood of foetuses), 
in certain areas medical science has well established evidence of what constitutes 
best practice (e.g. with regards to vaccination). While science is in the habit of 
overthrowing previously established facts, HCPs are not clairvoyant and should only 
act on the facts they have in front of them. While the arguments utilized throughout 
the article favour a greater freedom of professional practice, they do not imply that 
anarchy should reign in healthcare. Though there is no facility to compel an HCP to 
provide treatment they deem medically futile,43,44 giving advice contrary to scientific 
evidence would be valid grounds for questioning an HCP’s fitness to practice and 
hence striking them from the register. If an HCP would knowingly encourage a 
patient in their mistaken belief (e.g. that vaccinations cause autism),45 they would be 
acting in a maleficent manner towards their patient, contrary to the foundations of 
healthcare practice. Fulfilling malicious desires and fraud are not things that should 
be facilitated in a free society and should, at least in the sphere of healthcare, be 
grounds for criminal prosecution.46
Another potential objection is that if there is only a blurry line between PO and 
CO, could this not create a situation where an HCP could try to pass one off as the 
other? But this is the point on which we should refrain from judgment, for a HCP 
might simultaneously hold a CO and a PO against a specific procedure. Moreover, 
if neither of the two modalities hold a privileged status over the other, then does it 
matter whether an objection is presented as one or the other, as long as the statement 
is truthful? A doctor might have started work in an antenatal clinic (one that did not 
provide abortions) for matters of pure convenience—it was close to her house. Later, 
she espoused a pro-life perspective. Similarly, a doctor might have decided to work 
at such a clinic because of her religious views on abortion, which also translated to 
a philosophical outlook about the purpose of healthcare. Someone who objects to 
euthanasia on moral grounds (CO) is likely to also view killing as something that is 
not part of a HCPs job (PO category 1) and as something that has no scientifically 
proven benefit to the patient (PO category 2).47 There is no way of judging that one 
of these aspects is more important than the other or that the pro-life view of one of 
these doctors is more genuine than the view of the other. This, though, warrants 
the conclusion that the practice of healthcare cannot be reduced to the professional 
matters discussed in this paper. But it does not warrant the conclusion that professional 
matters are meaningless or that PO is indistinguishable from CO—only that it is 
possible (and even likely) for a person to hold CO and PO views that coincide with 
each other. 
The last objection is that medicine is practiced in a community and that 
practitioners should meet the standards expected by the community. Surely, these 
are the standards that allow for someone who seeks medical care to obtain it in a 
manner intelligible to them. Yet it is not the argument of this paper that HCPs have 
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the right to change the whole process of commerce or human interaction. Rather, 
that a degree of diversity within healthcare is the norm. For example, in the U.S.A., 
some physicians graduate with a M.D. degree, while some with a O.D. degree, where 
the philosophical assumptions about the practice differ. These together might have a 
different viewpoint on how health should be managed, compared to a chiropractor. 
Similarly, some pharmacies will sell certain products and not others, and certain 
specialists will provide some services and not others. Moreover, the literature is rich 
with varying opinions on how certain diseases should be treated. As such, the only 
thing that is needed to make PO comprehensible by community standards is an honest 
description of the services provided.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding the scope of an HCP’s right to object to the provision of 
particular treatments should not be limited to matters of conscience, though 
professional opinions might often overlap with one’s ethical viewpoint. HCPs are 
professionals who should be free to exercise their expertise in a manner respecting 
their wider worldview and scientific knowledge, allowing them to find fulfilment in 
their job and not burdening them disproportionally. Nevertheless, HCPs should not 
be free to harm their patients. While HCPs should not be compelled to provide all 
that a patient might seek, HCPs should provide healthcare and not act to the detriment 
of their patients’ health. This is not to say that ethics is not important in healthcare 
but that there are other legitimate reasons for objecting to the performance of certain 
practices that are not within the scope of traditional CO objections.
Epilogue
While I believe that the arguments presented in this paper offer a useful tool for HCPs 
to object to certain treatments, it is somewhat obvious that this is not a model for 
how healthcare should be done and that, even within the context of objections, it is 
an impoverished model. It certainly does not tell us much about what we must do for 
our patients, for this a teleological framework is needed to direct HCPs towards their 
purpose. But this is not the subject of this paper. Moreover, the framework runs at 
the risk of proving too much, for how far should the freedom of dissociation extend? 
Perhaps this is a signpost to the limits of a liberal and pluralistic framework that 
was used here. But if a secular institution rejects the arguments presented here, they 
will have to explain why healthcare is different from other crafts or acknowledge 
that there are issues with their own arguments. As such, my hope is that this paper 
will also be a prompt for reflection on the philosophical basis of medicine for those 
who accept the arguments here presented and who recognize that there is more to 
healthcare than business and expression of personal choice.xi 
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Endnotes
i. Christians might be, for example, as much Platonic as Aristotelian in their philosophical outlook 
and differ in their opinions on the evidence basis for various procedures. They will also differ in the 
specialisms they wish to pursue in their clinical special interests, and they will be subjects to the 
same material constraints that non-Hippocratic HCPs will face. Pragmatic (or practical) judgments 
are still necessary, though they should be prudent (and supported with prayer) and not just be clever 
in the eyes of the secular world.
ii. It is noteworthy that reasons 1 and 2 seem to be acceptable to at least some authors generally hostile 
to CO. Fiala and Arthur state that they accept objections based on “an obligation of doctors to their 
patients and to their professional ethics … based on evidence, medical ethics, and professional obli-
gations” and hence “are not grounded on the individual personal beliefs of HCPs, they do not qualify 
as CO.”48 See also the later example from Savulescu and Schuklenk.49 
iii. Scope of practice in general relates to the particular activities that one’s professional body and 
employer has described as one’s role. Yet here we emphasise that this is always interpreted by the 
individual within the context of a metaphysical understanding what healthcare as a craft/practice is 
(e.g. Hippocratic medicine is about healing, not harming, respecting confidentiality, etc.).
iv. The fact that futility is such a difficult concept, for which it is at times difficult to reach consensus, 
is part of the reason why such professional objections should be allowed. If it is a matter of licit 
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disagreement, then why should one be forced to comply with one reasonable opinion over another?
v. The concept of a craft-tradition is also discussed by Macintyre.50 The notion of healthcare as a 
profession passed from mentors and professors to students, with its heroes and great discoveries, 
as well as learned associations with all their traditions, lends itself also to such an understanding of 
healthcare. But this is a broader concept than the one with which we are concerned in this analysis.
vi. This might be not possible in practice in jurisdictions where only a HCP, rather than an institution, 
has the right to refuse undertaking a particular procedure, like in Belgium.51 
vii. Medical facilities have refused to perform abortions in the past for reasons other than ethical.52 
viii. For an interesting discussion on abortion within the context of the recent referendum in the Republic 
of Ireland, see the article written by Dr Tuathail.53 This article mentions some types of PO mentioned 
in this paper, such as abortions not being a routine part of general practice, as well as limitations 
relating to a practitioner’s fluency in a procedure.
ix. While the pro-life movement tends to be associated in the west with Christianity, secular (https://
www.secularprolife.org/) and other non-religious e.g. feminist pro-life groups (https://www.femi-
nistsforlife.org) do exist.
x. Objections to the provision of vaccines produced via human cell lines obtained from aborted 
foetuses are not mentioned here, as this is a matter of CO, not PO, and is strictly speaking not an 
opposition to vaccination.
xi. For such a teleological analysis of medicine and its relationship to practitioners objecting to the 
provision of specific services see Gamble, Nathan K. and Pruski, Michal 2019. Medical Acts and 
Conscientious Objection: What Can a Physician be Compelled to Do? The New Bioethics DOI: 
10.1080/20502877.2019.1649871.
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